It seems that you're in Germany. We have a dedicated site for Germany. Taking insights and controversies from feminist political theory, Lu looks to illuminate alternative images of 'sovereignty as privacy' and 'sovereignty as responsibility', and to identify new challenges arising from the increased agency of private global civil society, and their relationship with the world of states. Much of her originality stems from a reconsideration and reformulation of the public-private distinction.
The bulk of the book consists in a thorough examination of three ethical perspectives in international affairs: realism, communitarianism and cosmopolitanism. Lu writes intelligently about the premises and problems at work in the approaches of such authors as Rawls, Beitz and Walzer. She clearly endorses a liberal cosmopolitan perspective, placing what she calls "duties of humanity" at the very basis of international and domestic orders.
Her analysis is supplemented with an insightful consideration of the contemporary ethical challenges faced by state and civil society agents. The book ends with a lucid assessment of the limits of an approach that focuses on humanitarian intervention rather than on the duties of cosmopolitan justice. Macpherson Prize. Drawing on the conceptual similarities between family privacy and state sovereignty, Lu argues that just as privacy in the domestic context has been recalibrated in the name of protecting individuals, so state sovereignty as a form of privacy in the international context ought to be reconceived.
Framing health and foreign policy: lessons for global health diplomacy
If technological acceleration will be seen as an opportunity for ecosystem-based, pro-active, and network-oriented adaptation, then digital diplomacy is likely to penetrate the deep core of the diplomatic DNA. Rather than joining current affairs commentary on the impact of social media in international politics, we will, in this chapter, first turn to literature that can help throw a light on underlying issues.
It is our aim to inform the study of diplomacy as well as diplomatic practice with relevant theoretical insights and conceptualizations from this field. We conclude with general policy recommendations for MFAs. Agreement on essential terminology and a shared understanding of core concepts matters — and is not just relevant for academics.
Before arriving at conclusions about the impact of technological change in the practice of international relations, it is worthwhile to continue reflecting on the capacities of these new technologies. New warfare tactics used by Russian military intelligence during the U. Concretely, such societized diplomacy results in new dynamics in government-society relations and, arguably, more domestically oriented MFAs.
Many international challenges of our time have acquired some kind of digital dimension, such that their corresponding technologies provide a platform for social, political and economic activities that could be understood as being computationally formalized. Facebook and Google have already been attempting to tackle problems such as filter bubbles and fake news from a technical standpoint — yet, they may greatly benefit from the perspective of those specialized in interpreting and resolving the nature of such issues, such as conflict and misinformation.
Digital literacy would then range from engaging with ready-made software as a user all the way to coding it, gaining leverage over how users shall access it and what it allows one to do with it.
In the same way that certain companies conceive of sociality, transportation or marketing in terms of information and information systems, digital diplomacy would invite policy to conceive of entities, processes, strategies and values relevant to diplomacy at least partly as computational entities.
Digital literacy would then also refer to the ability to take on computation as a form of governance attuned to contemporary instruments of power, such as software. MFAs have therefore started thinking about the fundamental implications of digital transformation for the physical structures of their headquarters and embassies. To be sure, the advent of social media has shown entirely new dynamics in the relationship between diplomacy and technology. Following the Arab Spring, a variety of international crises between and were major learning opportunities for governments.
One important consequence of these fast-moving developments is that the governance of the digital realm needs to catch up.
In recent years, some western governments have lost their relative innocence. The practices of digital communication and outreach to foreign and domestic audiences do in fact seem to have disrupted public diplomacy to an extent that deserves urgent examination. Mechanisms constituting digital technologies can be actively used as tools to operationalize political and diplomatic interests. As diplomacy is increasingly enacted in a digital environment, diplomats should be critical of real-life actors behind software, of their intentions and how they pursue their aims, and to what effect.
Mechanisms constituting digital technologies can be used as a medium to operationalize political and diplomatic interests. The number of organized and institutionalized actors actively participating in the international sector is steadily increasing.
In addition, new partly-, pseudo- or quasi-governmental actors have come along. The way foreign policy is conducted needs to adapt continuously. Situations involving crisis and conflict in particular require intense communication among all involved parties. In Europe, Berlin will very often be one of the involved capitals. This inclusive effort mitigates the problem of asymmetrical influence between larger and smaller states, but is not enough to solve it.
During immediate and time-sensitive cases, communication increasingly takes place directly between capitals. Not merely the formal meetings of heads of government or specialized ministers, but also the numerous other formal and informal bi- and multilateral meetings. At these meetings opinions are expressed and agreements are reached that relativize the coordinating function of the foreign ministries in European affairs.
In addition, all relevant federal ministries in Germany have established task forces concerning international and European policy aspects of their ministries. Official representation of federal states at the EU is functioning similarly. In the case of the newly created Alternative for Germany AfD Europe-wide coordination of anti-European parties has only just begun.
Many of these parties belong to parliaments or governments on national levels. The role of party associations on the European level is significantly weaker than the role of national parties.
Addressing Injustice | Beyond Intractability
In that respect, national and European politicians can exert influence in this area. Diplomats are often affected by the agreements thus made, but are seldom involved and sometimes insufficiently informed. Due to the informal nature of these kinds of meetings and agreements, so far very few studies have examined their role.
Finally: Foreign policy is traditionally seen as the prerogative of the executive branch. There is only one institution in the transatlantic relationship whereby members of parliament on both sides of the Atlantic can regularly meet for an intense dialogue regarding foreign and security policy issues: the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO. One outstanding concrete example demonstrates how the Parliamentary Assembly can exert influence. Several years before the German Federal Government and the U.
The strengthening role of national parliaments in the diplomacy of their countries is thus something new, and governments benefit from contributions coming from different perspectives. It is possible that diplomats are thus not yet adequately prepared for these changes. But one thing is certain: the foreign ministries must prepare for the consequences of an emerging need to deal with new, increasingly influential actors when they revise their structures and procedures. In short, in the field of geoeconomic diplomacy money alone cannot secure influence.
Particularly in the European context such certain non-state actors play pivotal roles in determining the foreign policy options that diplomats enjoy at the international level. Such legal frameworks will only be efficient if they are loyally implemented by businesses actors and other government representatives. Particularly in the European context such non-state actors therefore play pivotal roles in determining the foreign policy options that diplomats enjoy at the international level. This analytical insensibility towards the nuts and bolts of the geoeconomic field also bears normative consequences.
Considering in a systemised way the role of domestic actors in foreign policy making, such as is prevalent in a great deal of literature on Foreign Policy Analysis and diplomacy studies, is in itself obviously far from being a novel approach. I argue that insights from the rapidly growing literature on network theory in IR could serve as a viable bridge in building such analytical frameworks.
While the former Russian move led to asset freezes and visa bans for individuals, the latter incident resulted in general economic sanctions adopted by the EU Council in July , essentially banning much economic activity with the Russian banking, energy and military sectors.
Analysts have described how the potentially divi sive question of imposing significant, strong economic sanctions against Russia has yet not torpedoed EU consensus on the matter. Here are some primary examples:. On the one hand, Chancellor Merkel and her Chancellery were actively engaged in the sanction negotiations from a very early stage of the conflict, while promoting a sturdier and more confrontational line towards Moscow than that preferred by the SPD-led MFA. The competencies that diplomats need to operate at the interface between foreign policy, economics and business were at the heart of a significant speech by U.
Such reflections on the special nature of geoeconomic diplomacy obviously relate to more general discussions about the agency of non-governmental actors in modern diplomacy. The logic of technological change seems to demand governance, and therefore international politics, of a density and quality that so far has been largely confined to politics within a state. That same logic also operates beyond the nation state. In fact, the logic of technological change seems to demand governance, and therefore international politics, of a density and quality that so far has been largely confined to politics within a state.
At the same time, domestic politics itself is changing under the transformative impact of globalization. Expectations concern material benefits as well as normative or ideological aspirations. Consequently, expectations are rising rapidly, and quite possibly exponentially.
The ability of politics to respond to rising needs and expectations for governance within and beyond the state may have grown in many instances, though there have also no doubt been cases of decline and regression e. Yet there exists a fundamental mismatch between, on the one hand, the realities of interdependence and rising expectations, and on the other, the capacity for global governance within an effective international order. As a result of this tension, the outcomes of global governance tend to fall short of what is needed and expected.
Sigmund Freud took up the concept and similarly used it to denote certain behavioural anomalies in his patients. The concept has occasionally been used as a metaphor in International Relations IR theory. Edward Luttwak is the other author who has used the concept of autism.
For these purposes, I define foreign policy autism FPA as follows:. As Senghaas and others have shown, such dysfunctional perceptions of world politics tend towards auto-immunization. The id obeys the inexorable pleasure principle. Nevertheless, to highlight the difference when evaluating national foreign policy performances is meaningful — and important. This trend has been mirrored also at the level of party systems.
Not all of these factors will necessarily strengthen autistic tendencies in foreign policy-making, and some may well even work against them. Disruptive FPA ultimately reflects the divisive, corrosive impact of globalization on Western societies.